This paper takes as its point of departure the recent publication of Heidegger's lecture course Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy and focuses upon Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's concept of pathos. Through a comparative analysis of Aristotle's concept of pathos and Heidegger's inventive reading of this concept, I aim to show the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's reading. It is my thesis that Heidegger's account is extremely rich and innovative as he frees up pathos from the narrow confines of psychology and incidental change and places it squarely into the center of the fundamental changes affecting a living being's existence; simultaneously, however, Heidegger sometimes overstates the ties that pathos has with other concepts such as ousia and logos and highlights exceptional rather than common meanings of pathos, thereby risking the charge of being unfaithful to Aristotle's text.
Introduction
Aristotle's general influence on Heidegger has been widely acknowledged, certainly by the Meister himself, who once told his students that "[i]t is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years." 1 English translation just appeared. 3 This work discusses, among other things, Aristotle's concept of pathos, 4 which is the precursor for Heidegger's later concepts of attunement (Stimmung) 5 and disposedness (Befindlichkeit) 6 Heidegger's account is extremely rich and innovative as he frees up pathos from the narrow confines of psychology and incidental change and places it squarely into the center of the fundamental changes affecting a living being's existence; simultaneously, however, Heidegger sometimes overstates the ties that pathos has with other concepts such as ousia and logos and highlights exceptional rather than common meanings of pathos, thereby risking the charge of being unfaithful to Aristotle's text.
While it is important to understand that Aristotle's concept of pathos informs
Heidegger's later concept of attunement (Stimmung) and disposedness (Befindlichkeit), it lays outside the scope of this article to discuss this particular development, as my main task here is to clarify Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, which is already a significantly challenging project considering the difficulty and density of Heidegger's text. Thus, this essay hopes to offer a helpful comparative analysis in conjunction with the recent publication and translation of Heidegger's lecture course, and it aims at offering an evaluation of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's concept of pathos.
We shall begin by giving an overview of the five main senses of pathos as they are found across Aristotle's corpus. We will subsequently give an overview of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's concept of pathos, which is followed by an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's reading.
The five main senses of pathos in Aristotle's corpus
The concept of pathos emerges across Aristotle's entire oeuvre, in his physics, metaphysics, rhetoric, psychology, and ethics. Within these works, pathos shows up with a wide variety of meanings, such as changeable quality, illness, emotion, and excruciating suffering. This spectrum of meanings within Aristotle's works becomes even larger if we also take into consideration related nouns such as pathēma and pathēsis, and related predicates such as pathētikos. It is exactly this wide spectrum of meanings of pathos and its related terms that has made it difficult to provide a comprehensive overview.
Bonitz's Index Aristotelicus 8 provides a critical starting-point for assessing the various uses of the concept of pathos in Aristotle. 9 Bonitz classifies pathos into five major spheres of meaning. He shows pivotal distinctions between these five different senses, while also granting correlations between them. It is important to discuss Bonitz's classification here, since it allows for a helpful comparison with Heidegger's reading of pathos. We will list Bonitz's account of the five senses of pathos below, and we will return to their overlap following this overview.
(1) Bonitz first lists pathos as the ergon -the work or effect -of the process of being acted upon (paschein), 10 i.e., of what is being done and what something is undergoing. This sense explicitly connects pathos with the concept of paschein, which is one of the categories signifying passive motion, i.e., "being acted upon"; notably,
paschein's antonym is the concept of poiein, which signifies active motion or "acting." In this first sense, pathos signifies the product in which the process of being acted upon (paschein) finds its completion. For instance, in Physics III.3, Aristotle discusses how the (passive) process of being taught finds its end in the effect (pathos) of acquiring knowledge (Physics III.3, 202a21-202b22).
(2) The second sense of pathos emerges in connection with the metaphysical concept of the hypokeimenon, the underlying substrate. 11 In this connotation, pathos acquires the significance of attribute -so much so that at times it is used as a synonym for the term "attribute" (symbebēkos), as, for example, in DA I.1, 402a8-9, where
Aristotle distinguishes the soul's nature and ousia from its incidental attributes or pathē.
Similarly, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes musical or pale as affections or attributes (pathē) that are to be distinguished from the underlying subject who acquires or loses these affections or attributes (Metaphysics IX.7).
(3) Thirdly, pathos acquires meaning with respect to quality, and more particularly, qualitative change (alloiōsis). 12 Here, pathos signifies that quality which is currently changing, or which is changeable. For instance, the coldness of a stone is a pathos since it is able to be changed to its opposite, namely warmth, through heat. 
Pathos as way of being
In his analysis of Aristotle's concept of pathos, Heidegger grants it to have a wide variety of meanings, but he also distinguishes three "fundamental meanings"
(Grundbedeutungen) of pathos in Aristotle. These three main senses are: (1) the "average, immediate" meaning of pathos as "changeable quality"; (2) a "specifically ontological" meaning of pathos important for the understanding of kinēsis, which correlates pathos with the ontological concept of being affected (paschein); and (3) a more "focused" or "specialized" (zugespitzte) 19 meaning: that of pathos as a changeable quality with relevance to a definite "being-region of life" (Seinsgebiet des Lebens) -passion (Leidenschaft) (GDAP 167). 20 In this last rendition, pathos should be understood as powerful (painful or pleasurable) emotion, affection, or passion.
Compared to Bonitz's classification, we can establish that Heidegger condenses
Bonitz's five spheres of meaning to three. More specifically, Heidegger omits here the spheres of meaning of pathos as attribute and that of pathos as misfortune or painful suffering. Although pathos in the latter sense emerges further on in Heidegger's notes, 21 it is important to bear in mind that the sense of pathos as attribute does not emerge in
Heidegger's notes, and we will speculate in Section 3 about the reasons for this omission.
Furthermore, in Heidegger's tripartite classification we can discover a particular hierarchical and interpretative emphasis. The important interpretive step that Heidegger makes is to correlate the third sense of pathos -that of a powerful emotion or passionto the first and second sense of pathos. By making pathos as emotion or passion the more "specialized" sense that is, simultaneously, connected both to the more common or average sense of pathos in the domain of change, and to the "ontological" sense of pathos as the effect of the process of suffering or being affected, pathos as emotion finds itself grounded in a far broader context: by correlating pathos as emotion to physical change and ontology, pathos as passion or emotion leaves the narrow domain of psychology and is instead situated within the broader domain of life and its movements.
Moreover, as we will see, Heidegger argues that the lively movement that pathos manifests is anything but incidental to who we are as living beings. Rather, pathos is to be regarded as one of the ways in which being comes to fruition and actuality. To argue for this point, Heidegger proposes a distinct reading of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
II.5. Aristotle's text states:
Since there are three ginomena in the soul -emotions (pathē), capacities (dynameis), and dispositions (hexeis) -virtue (aretē) must be one of these (EN II.5, 1105b19-21).
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In his analysis, Heidegger determines that the meaning of pathos is directly dependent upon the fact that pathos is a ginomenon in the soul. Here Heidegger reads the Greek verbal noun ginomenon as "that which comes into being," thus arguing that "pathos belongs to that, which becomes in the soul" (GDAP 168; my italics). 23 However, it is questionable whether ginomenon should be translated in this way, and it may be more reasonable to render it in the commonest sense of "that which is," in which case we ought to understand pathos as "one of the things which is in the soul." Especially since there is no question here of an aorist use of the verb gignomai, which would indicate the start of an activity, Heidegger's translation of pathos as that which "becomes" in the soul could be contested. 24 Notwithstanding the above critique, Heidegger's interpretation of pathos as "that which becomes" is a crucial stepping-stone for his interpretation of Aristotle's concept of pathos, since he argues that pathos is a "way of becoming" (Weise des Werdens) of the soul (GDAP 168, 169). Heidegger argues that the soul, for Aristotle, determines who we are, and is most essentially the being (ousia) of who we are. This means that pathos is not just one of the ways of becoming, but one of the ways of the becoming of being (GDAP 168; my italics). In Heidegger's words: "Thus, being has three different ways of becoming: p£qh, dun£meij, ›xeij" (GDAP 168). As additional support, Heidegger posits that pathos is a "way of being itself" (Weise des Sein selbst), because pathos in its semantic dependence upon the concept of being acted upon (paschein) signifies "being in the sense of being-moved" (GDAP 172). Heidegger summarizes this argument by stating that pathos is a "being-concept" (Seinsbegriff) (GDAP 172).
By establishing that pathos does not just signify any movement, but is rather to be designated as an essential movement of being, Heidegger frees up pathos from the narrow confines of incidental change, and places it squarely into the center of the fundamental changes affecting a living being's existence. The following section will discuss further what kind of movement pathos signifies for Heidegger.
Pathos as movement
As we saw in the preceding, the axis around which Heidegger's notion of pathos turns is his interpretation of pathos as movement. To clarify this specific kind of motion,
Heidegger quotes Aristotle's definition of pathos in Metaphysics V.21, where pathos is defined in the following way:
Pathos means in one sense a quality (poiotēs) in virtue of which a thing can be altered (alloiousthai), such as white and black, or sweet and bitter, or heaviness and lightness, or whatever else is of this sort. And in another sense it means the actualizations (energeiai) and the alterations (alloiōseis) of these. Of the latter, it implies especially harmful alterations and motions (blaberai alloiōseis kai kinēseis), and of these most of all those which are painful. Also, misfortunes and pains of considerable magnitude are called pathē (Metaphysics V.21, 1022b15-22). 25 In his reading, Heidegger gives a schematic outline of the four senses of pathos that can be distinguished in this passage . 26 ( issue that may be easily overlooked: that of the relationship between the affects that a being undergoes and the underlying disposition that makes those affects possible, either in an obstructing or in a facilitating way. For this reason, Heidegger writes that "pathos is not a turning around or changing that has its course set for itself, but a mode of being disposed (Sichbefinden) in the world that, at the same time, stands in a possible relation to hexis" (GDAP 171). In this regard, Heidegger makes clear that our dispositions are not to be isolated from the way the world affects us, and neither can our affections be isolated from our dispositions or hexeis. As Heidegger highlights, there is a fundamental correlation between our dispositions and our affections. Just as the pathē are characteristic of our entire human being and our Befindlichkeit in the world (GDAP 192), similarly our susceptibility or hexis can only find expression through and in the actual pathē with which it is connected. Thus, pathos confronts us with the fact that we are always already disposed in a particular way. Simultaneously, a disposition or hexis forms the "guiding thread" for grasping the being-structure (Seinsstruktur) of pathos" (GDAP
191).
Pathos constitutes a change that can be painful and destructive to the being that undergoes it, specifically as we saw in the fourth connotation listed by Heidegger, where pathos is associated with the 'size' or 'measure' of such painful events. Yet, Heidegger also notes that pathos does not necessarily have this destructive effect: it can also have the character of salvation (Retten) in the sense of the Greek soidzein -saving oneself and coming into oneself (GDAP 196 More precisely, it seems that through the activity, the disposition of the builder is 
Pathos as embodied life
Heidegger also points out that, for Aristotle, pathos as way of the becoming of being is not only limited to the soul, but includes the entire human being. As Heidegger writes: "the originary unity of the phenomenon of the p£qh lies in the being of human beings as such" (GDAP 177). To demonstrate that Aristotle himself saw the pathē as a unified phenomenon encompassing both body and soul, 29 Heidegger turns to De Anima I.1, where Aristotle states that "all pathē seem to be with (meta) a body" (DA I.1, 403a16;
cf. GDAP 203 ff.). In Heidegger's words, the pathē are always the pathē of a body (GDAP 206).
This holistic aspect of pathos also emerges in the inclusion of pleasure and pain in
Aristotle's formulation in the Nicomachean Ethics that the pathē are "accompanied (hepetai) by pleasure or pain" (EN II.5, 1105b21-24). Thus, with each pathos that one experiences, one's own personal well-being is affected, either in terms of a "higher" or "lower" sense of well-being, which Heidegger characterizes as a "higher-or lower-beingattuned" (GDAP 170). 30 Heidegger stresses that we should read the Greek verb hepetai as "accompany" instead of the common translation "follow," since pain and pleasure do not "follow" the pathē, but are simultaneously present with the emergence of the pathē. 31 Heidegger translates the pain and pleasure of which Aristotle speaks here as a form of being-situated or being-disposed (Befindlichkeit, Sichbefinden, GDAP 243, 244), since it is in pleasure and pain that our own being-in-relation is disclosed in either a pleasurable or a painful way. Heidegger emphasizes that since the quest for pleasure is given with living itself (GDAP 245), pleasure is not just a temporary phenomenon (GDAP 245), but fundamental to life itself. This implies that we, as living beings, can only be interested in particular pathē because we are fundamentally affective beings, i.e. situated and invested in our existence.
With this latter designation of pleasure as being inherent to life, which makes pathos inherent to life, we find that Heidegger once again pulls pathos squarely into the center of the living human being. Similar to his assessment of pathos as 'way of our being,' his assessment of pathos as being-disposed locates pathos in the core of our being, and thereby circumvents the understanding of pathos as a merely temporary phenomenon. In addition, Heidegger views pathos as given with life as such, and does not place pathos in the narrow framework of cause and effect.
Pathos as basis for logos
For his interpretation of the relationship between pathos and logos in Aristotle,
Heidegger turns to the definition of the pathē given in Rhetoric II.1:
The pathē are those sources of change on account of which people differ (metaballontes) in their judgments (kriseis) that are accompanied by pain and pleasure (Rhet. II.1, 1378a20-21).
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In Heidegger's reading of this passage, three things stand out. First, he again emphasizes that pathos is to be associated with movement or change -as expressed by the term metaballontes (GDAP 170). It is through the pathē that we radically change from one mode of being disposed (Befindlichkeit) to another. Secondly, through this change of mood, we take in or adopt another stance or position (Stellung), thereby reading Aristotle's "judgment" in the broad sense of stance or position (GDAP 170). Thirdly, Heidegger emphasizes that pain or pleasure is constitutive of pathos and not just an aftereffect (GDAP 170). With regard to the second point, Heidegger reads the "change of judgment" that follows pathos in a broad sense, as pertaining not just to a singular, isolated judgment, but to our entire being positioned towards the world (GDAP 170).
Drawing upon Aristotle's Rhetoric, Heidegger sketches a vivid picture of a speaker addressing his audience, appealing to their pathē and thereby allowing them to "take in a stance" towards the world (Stellungnahme zur Welt; GDAP 170).
In Heidegger's view, by obtaining greater clarity about the fundamental role that the pathē play with regard to our being positioned and directed towards the world, we also acquire more clarity about the "soil" or ground (Boden) for logos (GDAP 169). More specifically, Heidegger argues that the pathē are the fundamental possibilities according to which Dasein primarily orients itself about itself (GDAP 262), since the pathē "are the ground (Boden) out of which speaking grows (erwächst) and into which what has been spoken or expressed (das Ausgesprochene) grows back (wieder wächst)" (GDAP 262). 33 As an example of the fundamental role that the pathē play in the formation of speaking (logos), Heidegger cites Rhet. II.5, 1383a6 where Aristotle argues that people who become anxious approach others to deliberate and to obtain advice. He concludes that fear is the kind of disposition (Befindlichkeit) that brings one to speak (GDAP 261); especially when we are not simply fearful, but when we experience dread (Angst) and a sense of uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) we begin to speak, according to Heidegger (GDAP 261).
The important insight that can be drawn from Heidegger's reading is that pathos is not a particular isolated phenomenon occurring in one's mind, but one that grounds us in a far deeper and more fundamental way, as the foundation of our own speaking -both the beginning of speaking, and the speaking with each other. This also implies that speaking or logos does not occur in isolation, but is grounded in a far-wider orientation originating with our affectedness. In addition, logos gains broader appeal than that of just "thinking," as Heidegger associates it with a general "attitude" or stance towards the world.
The strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's reading
The As for the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's specific analyses above, we would do well to consider these individually:
(1) The strengths of Heidegger's reading of pathos as "way of being" is that it highlights the fact that pathos as mood or emotion finds broader metaphysical grounding in the concept of change and being affected (paschein), which shows that pathos is central to understanding the process of becoming who we are. The weakness of this reading, however, is that his interpretation of pathos moves extremely quickly through Aristotle's concepts without showing the fundamental connections in Aristotle's text. For instance, Heidegger's conclusion that pathos is a "way of being" hinges upon the argument that pathos must be a way of becoming of being, since it is a movement that takes place in the soul, which is an ousia (GDAP 168, 169 it may not work so well when viewed against an Aristotelian background. For Aristotle, our pathē have to be shaped through our logos, and our logos finds shape in and through our pathē. Put simply, for Aristotle, pathos and logos complement and co-constitute one another, instead of one founding the other, as Heidegger boldly claims.
Conclusion
Having assessed the specific strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's account, we should reach the conclusion that Heidegger's analysis is extremely rich and innovative in its reading of Aristotle's concept of pathos. For Heidegger is the one who puts pathos back on the "Aristotelian map" by showing the fundamental interconnections between the various senses of pathos as well as its connections with crucial concepts such as being, movement, disposition, embodiment, and logos. Indeed, Heidegger is very keen on showing how important affectivity is for all these strands of Aristotelian thought, and the recent surge of studies investigating physis, kinēsis, dynamis, and energeia 40 in
Aristotle's works is testament to the visionary role that Heidegger has played in pursuing pathos and movement as central to Aristotle's thinking.
At the same time, this article has also shown that Heidegger's analysis has some weaknesses too, insofar as it moves at times rather swiftly through Aristotle's texts and fails to mention that pathos can also play a more subsidiary role in Aristotle's universewhere pathos sometimes merely means attribute or incident. Moreover, at times, Heidegger overstates connections between pathos and other concepts, or is too invested in the positive aspects of pathos, which leads him to overemphasize its role as rescue or salvation, whereas the context of Aristotle's works points to something far more humble or prosaic, such as the simple actualization of sense-perception.
Despite the problems with Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's concept of pathos however, we think the strengths of Heidegger's analysis win out over the weaknesses.
Heidegger's reading has opened up the dynamic, fluid world of Aristotle's thinking of affectivity, and forces us to look more carefully both at Aristotle's individual works and at the oeuvre as such in search for conceptual understanding and intertwining. 41 
